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11 Introduction
Would you lend a complete stranger $10,000? How would you get your money back?
Trusting people you don’t know ...may sound like the height of foolishness. But a
modern economy depends on exactly such impersonal exchange. Every day, people
lend ...to strangers with every expectation that they’ll be repaid. Vendors supply
goods and services, trusting that they’ll be compensated within a reasonable time.
How does it all work?
From “Even Without Law, Contracts Have a Way of Being Enforced”
New York Times, October 10, 2002
Such impersonal exchange lies at the heart of this paper. In many situations communities
of agents are involved in bilateral transactions with each other, and it may be reasonable to
assume that agents do not recognize each other or have very limited information about each
other’s actions. In such situations, how does impersonal exchange take place? Can players
achieve cooperative outcomes? This is the central question of this paper. Formally, I ask
whether every feasible and individually rational payoﬀ vector of a two-player game can be an
equilibrium outcome in the inﬁnitely repeated game between two communities, where players
are anonymously randomly matched to one another in every period and players do not observe
the complete history of past play.
It is well-known that when only two players interact repeatedly, any feasible and individually
rational payoﬀ can be sustained in equilibrium, provided players are suﬃciently patient. Fur-
ther, we know that the Folk Theorem extends (under appropriate conditions) to games with N
players, with perfect monitoring, imperfect public monitoring and to certain games with private
monitoring. Any feasible and individually rational payoﬀ can be achieved using a mechanism of
personal punishment. If a player deviates, her rival can credibly retaliate and punish her in the
future. The threat of future punishment deters patient players from deviating. However, these
results implicitly assume that players recognize their rivals, and so cooperation can be sustained
through the threat of personalized punishments. In interactions in large communities where
players meet each other infrequently and anonymously, personalized punishments are not pos-
sible. Players may change partners and may not know each other’s true identities. So it is not
possible for a victim to accurately punish the culprit. Can cooperation then not be sustained?
To examine this question, I consider an inﬁnitely repeated stage-game played between two
2communities. In every period, members of one community are randomly matched to members
of the rival community.1 Each player plays the stage-game with the opponent she is randomly
matched to. Players cannot observe the entire pattern of play within the communities. I impose
the strong informational restriction that players observe only the transactions they are personally
engaged in. Further, they do not recognize each other. There is limited communication. I
only allow players to introduce themselves (announce a name) before they play in each period.
However, names are not veriﬁable, and the true identity of a player cannot be known through
her announced name. Players cannot communicate in any other way within their community or
communicate the identity of their past opponents. Within this setting of limited information, I
examine what payoﬀs can be achieved in equilibrium.2
Achieving any feasible, individually rational payoﬀ in equilibrium through only personalized
punishments may be diﬃcult as players are essentially anonymous. A form of punishment that
has been used in similar settings is “community enforcement”. In community enforcement a
player who deviates is punished not necessarily by the victim but by other players in the society
who become aware of the deviation. For instance, in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game if a player
faces a defection, she could punish any rival in the future by switching to defection forever. By
starting to defect, she would spread the information that someone has defected. The defection
action would spread (“contagion”) throughout the population, and cooperation would eventually
break down. The credible threat of such a breakdown of cooperation can deter players from
defecting in the ﬁrst place. Earlier literature (e.g. Kandori (1992), Ellison (1994)) has shown
that in a PD game, such community enforcement can be used to achieve eﬃciency. Why do
players have the incentive to punish even when they know that they may not be matched to the
original defector and may spread the contagion more quickly? In the PD, the maximum one-
period gain from defecting is the same as the one-period loss from not defecting to slow down the
contagion. Ellison (1994) establishes that the loss from starting the contagion is greater than
the gain from slowing it down once it has started, even without any kind of communication.
Consequently, it is possible that players fear a breakdown of cooperation enough that they will
not deviate ﬁrst, but do not fear so much that they are unwilling to spread the contagion once it
has begun. However, in general, games may not have this feature and this contagious community
1The assumption of two communities is not necessary. The results of this paper continue to hold if there just is
one community of agents playing the repeated anonymous random matching game. See Section 3.5 for more on this.
2The result would extend to environments in which more information can be transmitted.
3enforcement does not work. So far, little is known on how to attain cooperation in this setting
with any game other than the PD.3
The main result I obtain is a possibility result - a Folk Theorem for inﬁnitely repeated random
matching games - which states that for any two-player game played between two communities, it
is possible to sustain all feasible individually rational payoﬀs in a sequential equilibrium, provided
players are suﬃciently patient and can announce names. I establish the result constructively by
identifying strategies that can attain any given feasible, individually rational payoﬀ.4
Interestingly, in this paper, cooperation is sustained neither by personalized punishments nor
by community enforcement. It is no longer the case that a deviator is punished by third-parties
in her victim’s community. On the contrary, if a player cheats she is punished only by her victim,
but her entire community is held responsible for the deviation and everyone in her community
is punished by her victim. I call this form of punishment “community responsibility”.
The terminology is inspired by the community responsibility system, an institution prevalent
in medieval Europe (Greif (2006)). Under the community responsibility system, if a member of
any community defaulted or cheated, all members of her community were held legally liable for
the default. The property of any member of the defaulter’s community could be conﬁscated.
The system internalized the cost of a default by each of their members on other members.5 This
paper does not involve any exogenous enforcement institutions, but the equilibrium strategies
used turn out to have a similar ﬂavor in the sense that if a member of a community deviates in
any transaction, the victim holds the entire community of the deviator liable for the deviation.
Further, in describing the utility of the community responsibility system in Europe, Greif
(2006) makes the following observation:
Communal liability ...supported intercommunity impersonal exchange. Exchange
did not require that the interacting merchants have knowledge about past conduct,
3In this paper, when I refer to sustaining cooperation or cooperative outcomes, I refer to any feasible and individ-
ually rational payoﬀ that is not a static Nash equilibrium outcome.
4In establishing the main result, I focus on achieving identical payoﬀs within a community. See Remark 2 in
Section 3.3 for a discussion of how this can be generalized.
5See Greif (2006). “Historical evidence ...supports the claim that the community responsibility system prevailed
throughout Europe. ...In a charter granted to London in the early 1130s, King Henry I announced that ‘all debtors
to the citizens of London discharge these debts ...and if they refuse to pay ...then the citizens to whom the debts
are due may take pledges either from the borough or from the village ...in which the debtor lives’.”
4share expectations about trading in the future, have the ability to transmit infor-
mation about a merchant’s conduct to future trading partners, or know a priori the
personal identity of each other.
This also captures the essence of why in the framework of this paper, community respon-
sibility works in games where community enforcement does not. It is important to note that
information transmission is critical to sustaining cooperation through community enforcement.
Since dishonesty needs to be punished by third-parties who were not a part of the original
dishonest transaction, information transmission is required to start the punishment. In Ellison
(1994), when a player starts deviating after observing a deviation, she transmits the information
to a third-party that a deviation has occurred. In a prisoner’s dilemma, information about the
deviation can be transmitted indirectly through the act of defection. For other games, transmis-
sion of some veriﬁable (“hard”) information seems to be necessary. Kandori (1992) introduces
local information processing, where information about past deviations is transmitted through
labels which depend on a player’s history of play. Takahashi (2007) allows veriﬁable ﬁrst-order
information. In this paper I obtain a Folk Theorem for general games without introducing
any hard information in the model. Players are allowed to announce names, but names are
not veriﬁable. There is no hard information. Community responsibility does not require third-
parties to carry out punishments and consequently can be implemented even with these strong
informational restrictions and little transmission of information.
What is community responsibility in the context of this paper and how does it work? Con-
sider two communities with M players each. Players from the two communities are randomly
matched into pairs to play the stage-game. We allow players to announce their names in each
period before they play the stage-game. Think of each player as playing separate but identical
games, one with each of the M names of her rival community. A player treats her interactions
with each rival name separately and conditions play against any name on the history of play
with that name. Play with each name proceeds in blocks of length T (i.e. T interactions).
Players keep track of the stage of a block they are in separately for each possible name. Each
player plays one of two strategies of the T-fold repeated stage-game within a block. At the
beginning of each block, each player is indiﬀerent between the two strategies, but one of the
strategies ensures a low payoﬀ for her opponent and the other a high payoﬀ. So, in the ﬁrst
period of any block (called the plan period), each player mixes between the two strategies in a
way to ensure that her opponent gets the target equilibrium payoﬀ. The realized action in the
5plan period serves as a coordination device and indicates the plan of play within that block. If
a player plays certain actions, she is said to send a “good” (bad) plan and play in that block
proceeds according to the strategy that is favorable (unfavorable) for the opponent. At the start
of the next block, each player tailors her rival’s continuation payoﬀ based on the actions played
in the last block, by appropriately choosing the probability with which she sticks to or changes
her chosen strategy. Players can control the continuation payoﬀs of their rivals by appropriately
mixing between two strategies, irrespective of what their rival plays.
Since each player conditions play on the name announcement she hears, players may have
incentives to misreport names. We construct strategies to prevent misreporting. For any pair of
players, the second interaction in any block of length T is designated as the “signature period”
and members of a pair play actions that serve as their “signatures”. The signatures for any pair
of players are diﬀerent pure actions based on the action realized in their ﬁrst interaction. No
player outside a pair can observe the action realized in their ﬁrst interaction, and so no one can
know what the appropriate signature action is. So, if a player outside a pair impersonates one
of the players in this pair, she can end up playing the wrong signature in case it is a signature
period, and her impersonation will get detected.
If a player observes an incorrect signature in a signature period, she knows that a deviation
has occurred, though the identity of the deviator is unknown. She holds the deviator’s entire
community responsible and punishes them all by switching to the bad plan with each of her rivals
in their next plan period. Since every player is indiﬀerent between her two strategies at the start
of any block, she can switch to a strategy that is bad for all her opponents without aﬀecting her
own payoﬀ in any way. Notice that punishments are carried out by the victim herself and not
by third parties. However, innocent members of the deviator’s community are held responsible
and punished. Indiﬀerence at the start of each block makes community responsibility a credible
threat. For suﬃciently patient players, this threat can deter impersonations and deviations from
the equilibrium path.
At this point, it is worthwhile to ask the following question. If community responsibility
prescribes punishing everybody in the community after a deviation and does not condition
punishments on names, then why do we need names? It turns out that though the names are
not used to personalize punishments oﬀ the equilibrium path, players need to use the names on
the equilibrium path to tailor the continuation payoﬀs of their rivals.
In an extension, I show that the Folk Theorem extends to K-player games being played by
6K > 2 communities, where players from each community are randomly matched in each period
to form K-player groups to play the stage-game. The same idea of community responsibility is
used to attain cooperation. Each community acts as the monitor of one other community. Say
community 1 is the monitor of community 2. If any player in community 2 deviates, the player
from community 1 whom she meets in that period holds the whole of community 2 responsible
and punishes all members of community 2 that she meets in the future.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to two independent streams of literature. First, it contributes to the liter-
ature that asks similar questions about cooperation and impersonal exchange. These questions
have been asked earlier for the prisoner’s dilemma in the framework of repeated random match-
ing games. Second, this paper is related to recent literature on repeated games with imperfect
private monitoring, because of methodological similarities.
1.1.1 Connection with Community Enforcement
Kandori (1992) is one of the early papers that studies community enforcement. Kandori studies
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma with anonymous random matching. Players only see the trans-
actions they are personally involved in and there is no other form of information transmission.
It is shown that if the loss from being cheated is large enough, and if players are suﬃciently
patient, eﬃciency can be achieved. Eﬃciency is achieved through contagion. If any player faces
defection, she indiscriminately defects against any other player she meets in the future. Defec-
tion spreads like an epidemic and cooperation breaks down. The threat of such a breakdown in
cooperation helps sustain cooperation on the equilibrium path.
Kandori (1992) also considers games beyond the prisoner’s dilemma, but requires signiﬁ-
cantly more information in the model. He assumes the existence of a mechanism that assigns
labels to players based on their history of play. Players who have deviated or seen a deviation
can be distinguished from those who have not, by their labels. These labels naturally enable
transmission of information and cooperation can be sustained through community enforcement.
Ellison (1994) generalizes Kandori’s ﬁrst result and shows that cooperation is possible in
equilibrium for any prisoner’s dilemma game using contagious strategies, with no information
transmission. Contagious strategies however critically depend on the speciﬁc structure of the
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) - in particular on symmetry and on the existence of a Nash equilibrium
7in strictly dominant strategies. As mentioned earlier, in the PD, the maximum short-term gain
from deviating on the equilibrium path is the same as the short-term loss from not punishing
when a player successfully slows down the contagion. Ellison (1994) proves that the future
loss from deviating on equilibrium path is greater than the future gain from slowing down the
contagion once it has started. Consequently, it is possible to make the short-term loss / gain
from following equilibrium strategies to lie between the two future eﬀects. This argument does
not apply to a general game.6
In a recent paper, Takahashi (2007) again considers the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game
with random matching but with a continuum of agents. Cooperation is sustained through
community enforcement but by allowing ﬁrst-order information. Players have available to them
the complete history of past actions of their partner in each period.
A stark gap evident in the current literature is that little is known about games other than
the prisoner’s dilemma. This paper tries to ﬁll this gap. I consider general two-player games
being played by communities of agents who are randomly matched in each period. I obtain
the Folk Theorem for general games under the mild informational assumption that players can
announce names, though announcements are not veriﬁable.
As discussed earlier, this paper is diﬀerent from earlier work in that it does not use com-
munity enforcement, but introduces the alternate route of community responsibility. Since
community enforcement involves third-party punishments, it requires information transmission.
On the contrary, community responsibility requires only a victim (a player who directly ob-
serves a deviation) to punish. Consequently, community responsibility requires less information
transmission and we can achieve the Folk Theorem without addition of any hard information.
This paper also goes beyond the current literature in considering repeated random matching
games with more than two players. In an extension of the main model, the Folk Theorem is
shown to also hold for K-player games played by K communities.
1.1.2 Connection with Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
While this paper’s contribution is substantively related to community enforcement, the method-
ological content is closely related to recent advances in repeated games with imperfect private
6As Ellison (1994) points out, in general games this argument shows that a symmetric strategy proﬁle (a,a) is an




∗ is a best response to a (e.g. in games with a dominant strategy equilibrium).
8monitoring.
Community responsibility depends on the fact that the player who detects a deviation is
willing to punish the deviator’s entire community. However, the detector may not have an
incentive to punish if the punishment action either involves a short-term cost, or alters her own
continuation payoﬀ adversely. In my equilibrium construction, punishing is not costly in either
of these ways. When a player has to punish, she is indiﬀerent (in that period) between punishing
and not punishing. Further, a player starts punishing only in periods when she is indiﬀerent
and is supposed to mix between all her actions on the equilibrium path. So even when a player
punishes, her rival cannot know if her action is a punishment or not. So, the punishment action
cannot change her continuation payoﬀ. This indiﬀerence is important to the construction and is
reminiscent of the equilibrium strategies used in the literature on imperfect private monitoring.
Ely-H¨ orner-Olszewski (2005) study belief-free equilibria in repeated games with imperfect
private monitoring. The strategies have the special feature that in inﬁnitely many periods, each
player is indiﬀerent between several actions that she can play. But her actions give diﬀerent
continuation payoﬀs to her opponent - some ensure a high payoﬀ and others a low payoﬀ. In
equilibrium, each player chooses actions (mixes) based on her opponent’s past play. She can
choose an action that is favorable to reward her opponent or an unfavorable one to punish her.
H¨ orner-Olszewski (2006) generalize this idea with “block strategies” that are characterized
by periodic indiﬀerence. Play proceeds in blocks of say T periods each. In each block of T
periods, players use one of two strategies of the T-fold repeated game. The length T is chosen
so that the average payoﬀ of the four resulting strategy proﬁles surrounds the target payoﬀ
vector. For any player, one of the two strategies guarantees her opponent a continuation payoﬀ
higher than the target payoﬀ, and the other guarantees her opponent a payoﬀ strictly lower
than the target payoﬀ. So players are not indiﬀerent over their opponent’s choice of strategies.
However, players can be made indiﬀerent over their own two strategies at the start of each block,
by appropriately choosing the probability of using these strategies in each block as a function
of the play in the most recently elapsed block. In fact players are indiﬀerent between these
two strategies and weakly prefer them to all others. The target payoﬀ is achieved by suitably
choosing the probability with which each strategy is used in the initial block of the game.
In this paper, I build on the block strategies of H¨ orner-Olszewski (2006). As mentioned
above, the block structure provides each player with inﬁnitely many periods of indiﬀerence,
which make the threat of punishments credible. However, in the random matching setting of
9this paper, players need to use block strategies separately with each possible opponent they can
be matched to. They have to track what stage of a block they are in separately for each rival.
This is precisely where the names are used - to track the games with each opponent separately.
Random matching also poses other diﬃculties - the duration of a block (in calendar time)
between any pair of players is now random. It is not clear that it is possible for a player to
adjust her rival’s continuation payoﬀ by just appropriately mixing her two strategies in a block,
as a function of the play in the most recently elapsed block. If a block takes a very large number
of calendar time periods, the required adjustment in payoﬀ may not be feasible. I show that it
is actually possible to adjust continuation payoﬀs in a way that, in expectation, at every stage
of a block, players are indiﬀerent between their two strategies and prefer them to all others.
A novel feature of the construction in this paper is that it is possible to convert unveriﬁable
information into hard information. The signature periods discussed above play exactly this
role. Even though messages (names) are unveriﬁable, the signatures provide players a means to
ensure that no one has an incentive to misreport their names - eﬀectively converting the soft
messages into hard information. Further, signatures enable this veriﬁcation without enriching
players’ communication possibilities, but just through the actions available to players in the
underlying game. This poses challenges as playing the right signature action has potential
payoﬀ consequences in the short-term, and continuation payoﬀs have to be speciﬁed to satisfy
intertemporal incentives of players.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3,
I establish the Folk Theorem and discuss its key features. In Section 4, I extend the result to
K > 2 communities and multilateral matching. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are contained in
the appendix.
2 Model and Notation
Players: The game is played by two communities of players. Each community I, I ∈ {1,2}
comprises M > 2 players7, say I := {I1,...,IM}. To save notation, I will often denote a generic
element of any community of players I by i.
Random Matching and Timing of Game: In each period t ∈ {1,2,...}, players are ran-
domly matched into pairs with each member l of Community 1 facing a member l′ := mt(l)
7See Section 3.4 for the case M = 2.
10of Community 2. The matches are made independently and uniformly over time, i.e. for all
histories, for all l,l′, Pr[l′ = mt(l)] = 1
M .8 After being matched, each member of a pair simul-
taneously announces a message (“her name”). Then, they play a two-player ﬁnite stage-game.










Figure 1: Timing of Events
Message Sets: Each community I has a set of messages NI,I ∈ {1,2}. Let NI be the set of
names of players in community I (i.e. NI = {I1,...,IM}).9 For any pair of matched players,
the pair of announced messages (names) is denoted by ν ∈ N := N1×N2. For any I, let ∆(NI)
denote the set of mixtures over messages in NI. Messages are not veriﬁable, in the sense that
a player cannot verify if her rival is actually announcing her name. So, the true identity of a
player cannot be known from her announced name. “Truthful reporting” by any player i means
that player i announces name i. Any other announcement by player i is called “misreporting”
or “impersonating”.
Stage-Game: The stage-game Γ has ﬁnite action sets AI,I ∈ {1,2}. Denote an action proﬁle
by a ∈ A := A1 × A2. For each I, let ∆(AI),I ∈ {1,2} denote the set of mixtures of actions in
AI. Stage-game payoﬀs are given by a function u : A → R2. Deﬁne F to be the convex hull
of the payoﬀ proﬁles that can be achieved by pure action proﬁles in the stage-game. Formally,
F := conv({(u(a) : a ∈ A}). Let v∗
i denote the mixed action minmax value for any player i.
8Unlike in earlier literature, the result does not depend on the matching being uniform or independent over time.
See Remark 1 in Section 3.3, for a discussion on how this assumption can be relaxed.
9An implicit assumption is that the sets of messages NI contain at least M distinct messages each. For instance,
we can allow players to be silent by interpreting some message as silence. In the exposition, I use exactly M messages
as this is the coarsest information that suﬃces. Also, M messages have the reasonable interpretation of player names.
11For i ∈ I, v∗
i := minα−i∈ (A−I) maxai∈AI ui(ai,α−i). Let F∗ denote the individually rational
and feasible payoﬀ set, i.e. F∗ := {v ∈ F : vi > v∗
i ∀i}. We consider games where F∗ has
non-empty interior (IntF∗  = ∅).10 Let γ := maxi,a,a′{|ui(a) − ui(a′)|}.
All players have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). No public randomization device is
assumed. All primitives of the model are common knowledge.
Information Assumptions: Players can observe only the transactions they are personally
engaged in, i.e. each player knows the names that she encountered in the past and the action
proﬁles played with each of these names. Since names are not veriﬁable, she does not know the
true identity of the players she meets. She does not know what the other realized matches are
and does not observe play between other pairs of players.
Histories, Strategies and Payoﬀs: We deﬁne histories and strategies as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A complete private t-period history for a player i is given by ht
i := {(ν1,a1),...,
(νt,at)}, where (ντ,aτ), τ ∈ {1,...,t} represent the name proﬁle and action proﬁle observed by
player i in period τ. The set of complete private t-period histories is given by H t
i := (N ×A)t.





Deﬁnition 2 An interim private t-period history for player i is given by kt
i := {(ν1,a1),...,
(νt−1,at−1),νt} where ντ and aτ, τ ∈ {1,...,t} represent respectively the name proﬁle and ac-
tion proﬁle observed by player i in period τ. The set of interim private t-period histories is
given by K t
i := H
t−1





Deﬁnition 3 A strategy for a player i in community I ∈ {1,2} is a mapping σi such that,




σi(x) ∈ ∆(NI) if x ∈ Hi,
σi(x) ∈ ∆(AI) if x ∈ Ki.
Σi is the set of i’s strategies. A strategy proﬁle σ speciﬁes strategies for all players (i.e. σ ∈
×iΣi).
10Observe that this restriction is not required in standard Folk Theorems for two-player games (e.g. Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986)). It is however used in the literature on imperfect private monitoring (See H¨ orner-Olszewski (2006)).
Note also that this restriction implies that |Ai| ≥ 2 ∀i.
12In some abuse of notation, for ki ∈ Ki and hi ∈ Hi we let σi(ai|ki) and σi(νi|hi) denote the
probability with which i plays ai and νi conditional on history ki and hi respectively, if she is
using strategy σi. We denote equilibrium strategies by σ∗.
A player’s payoﬀ from a given strategy proﬁle σ in the inﬁnitely repeated random matching
game is denoted by Ui(σ). It is the normalized sum of discounted payoﬀs from the stage-games





Beliefs: Given any strategy proﬁle σ, after any private history, we can compute the beliefs
that each player has over all the possible histories that are consistent with her observed private
history. Denote such a system of beliefs by ξ.
Deﬁnition 4 A strategy proﬁle σ together with an associated system of beliefs ξ is said to be
an assessment. The set of all assessments is denoted by Ψ.
Solution Concept: The solution concept used here is sequential equilibrium. While sequen-
tial equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson (1982)) is formally deﬁned for ﬁnite extensive form games,
the notion can be extended naturally to this setting. Let Σ0 denote the set of totally mixed
strategies, i.e. Σ0 := {σ : ∀i,∀ki ∈ Ki,∀ai,σi(ai|ki) > 0 and ∀i,∀hi ∈ Hi,∀νi,σi(νi|hi) > 0}.
In other words, strategy proﬁles in Σ0 specify that in every period, players announce all the
names with a strictly positive probability and play all feasible actions with strictly positive
probability. If strategies belong to Σ0 all possible histories are reached with positive probability.
Players’ beliefs can be computed using Bayes’ Rule at all histories. Let Ψ0 denote the set of
all assessments (σ,ξ) such that σ ∈ Σ0 and ξ is derived from σ using Bayes’ Rule. We deﬁne
sequential equilibrium in the following way.




























(ii) consistent in the sense that there exists a sequence of assessments {σn,ξn} ∈ Ψ0 such
that for every player, and every interim and complete private history, the sequence converges to
(σ∗,ξ∗) uniformly in t.
13Later, we use the T-fold ﬁnitely repeated stage-game as well. To avoid confusing T-period
strategies with the supergame strategies, we deﬁne the following.
Deﬁnition 6 Consider the T-fold ﬁnitely repeated stage-game (ignoring the round of name
announcements). Deﬁne an action plan to be a strategy of this ﬁnitely repeated game in the
standard sense. Denote the set of all action plans by ST
i .
3 The Main Result
Theorem 1 (Folk Theorem for Random Matching Games) Consider a ﬁnite two-player game
and any (v1,v2) ∈ IntF∗. There exists a sequential equilibrium that achieves payoﬀs (v1,v2)
in the corresponding inﬁnitely repeated random matching game with names with 2M players, if
players are suﬃciently patient.
Before formally constructing the equilibrium, I ﬁrst describe the overall structure.
3.1 Structure of Equilibrium
Each player plays M diﬀerent but identical games, one with each of the M names in the rival
community. Players report their names truthfully. So, on the equilibrium path, players really
play separate games with each of the M possible opponents. They condition their play against
any opponent only on their history of play against the same name.
3.1.1 T-period Blocks
Let (v1,v2) ∈ IntF∗ be the target payoﬀ proﬁle. We will choose an appropriate positive integer
T. Play between members of any pair of names then proceeds in blocks of T periods in which
they meet. (Note that a block of length T for any pair of players comprises T interactions
between them, and so typically takes more than T periods in calendar time.) In any block of T
interactions, players use one of two action plans of the T-fold ﬁnitely repeated game. One of the
action plans used by a player i ensures that rival name −i cannot get on average more than v−i,
independently of what player −i plays. The other action plan ensures that rival name −i gets
on average at least v−i. In the initial period of a block (henceforth called “plan period”), each
player randomizes between these two action plans in a way that ensures that the target payoﬀ
of her rival name is achieved in expectation. At the end of the block, by suitably choosing the
14probability of sticking to or changing her action plan, each player tailors her rival’s continuation
payoﬀ based on play in the last block. Conditional on truthful reporting of names, the form of
strategies described above will be shown to constitute an equilibrium.
To ensure that players announce names truthfully in equilibrium, we need a device that
enables players to detect impersonations and provides incentives to a detector to punish them.
3.1.2 Detecting Impersonations
I use a device called signatures to detect impersonations. In this paper, “detection” of an
impersonation means that if a player impersonates, then with positive probability a player in
the rival community will become aware in the current period or in the future that some deviation
from equilibrium has occurred. This kind of detection along with appropriate incentives for the
detector to punish impersonations will enable cooperation.
Every pair of players designates their second interaction in each block as the “signature
period” and in this interaction, members of a pair play actions that serve as their “signatures”.
The signature depends on the action proﬁle realized in the plan period of that block. Players
use diﬀerent pure actions depending on what action proﬁle was realized in the plan period. No
player outside the pair can observe the realized action in the plan period. Consequently, no one
outside a pair knows what the correct signature for that pair is. When a player impersonates
someone, her announced name could be in a signature period with the rival she is matched
to. In this case, with positive probability the impersonator can play the wrong signature, and
so get detected. When her rival observes the wrong signature, she knows that play is not on
equilibrium path.
3.1.3 Community Responsibility
Now, if a player observes an incorrect signature in a signature period with any rival, she knows
that someone has deviated. The nature of the deviation or the identity of the deviator is
unknown - it is possible that her current rival reported her name truthfully but played the
wrong signature or that she met an impersonator now or previously. She holds all the members
of her rival community responsible for the deviation, and punishes them by switching to the
bad action plan (with arbitrarily high probability) with each of her rivals in their next plan
period. Note that she is indiﬀerent between her two action plans at the start of any block. But
the continuation payoﬀs her rivals get are diﬀerent for these two action plans, with one plan
15being strictly better than the other for her rivals. Consequently, she can punish the entire rival
community without aﬀecting her own payoﬀ adversely.
3.2 Construction of Equilibrium Strategies
Consider any payoﬀ proﬁle (v1,v2) ∈ IntF∗. Pick payoﬀ proﬁles wGG,wGB,wBG,wBB such
that the following conditions hold.
1. wGG
i > vi > wBB
i ∀i ∈ {1,2}.
2. wGB
1 > v1 > wBG
1 .
3. wBG
2 > v2 > wGB
2 .
These inequalities imply that there exists vi and ¯ vi with v∗
i < vi < vi < ¯ vi such that the rect-
angle [v1, ¯ v1] × [v2, ¯ v2] is completely contained in the interior of conv({wGG,wGB,wBG,wBB})
and further ¯ v1 < min{wGG
1 ,wGB
1 }, ¯ v2 < min{wGG
1 ,wBG
1 }, v1 > max{wBB
1 ,wBG
1 } and v2 >
max{wBB
1 ,wGB




















Figure 2: Payoﬀ Proﬁles
Clearly, there may not exist pure action proﬁles whose payoﬀs satisfy these relationships,
but there exist correlated actions that achieve exactly these payoﬀs wGG,wGB,wBG,wBB. We
can approximate these correlated actions using long enough sequences of diﬀerent pure action









N } such that each vector wXY , the average discounted payoﬀ
vector over the sequence {aXY
1 ,...,aXY
N } satisﬁes the above relationships if δ is large enough.
16Further, we can ﬁnd ǫ ∈ (0,1) small so that v∗
i < (1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi < vi < (1 − ǫ)¯ vi + ǫvi. In
the equilibrium construction that follows, when I refer to an action proﬁle aXY , I actually refer
to the ﬁnite sequence of action proﬁles {aXY
1 ,...,aXY
N } described above.
3.2.1 Deﬁning Strategies at Complete Histories: Name Announcements
At any complete private history, players announce their names truthfully.
∀i,∀t,∀ht




3.2.2 Deﬁning Strategies at Interim Histories: Actions
Partitioning of Histories: Now think of each player playing M separate games, one against
each rival. Since players truthfully report names in equilibrium, players can condition play on
the announced name.
Deﬁnition 7 A pairwise game denoted by Γi,−i is the “game” player i plays against name
−i. Player i’s private history of length t in this pairwise game is denoted by ˆ ht
i,−i and comprises
the last t interactions in the supergame for player i in which she faced name −i.
Now, at any interim private history of the supergame, each player i partitions her history into
M separate pairwise histories ˆ ht
i,−i,−i ∈ {1,...,M} corresponding to each of her pairwise
games Γi,−i. If her current rival name is j, she plays game Γi,j, i.e. for any interim history
kt
i = {(ν1,a1),...,(νt−1,at−1),νt}, if νt
−i = j, player i plays her pairwise game Γi,j.
Since equilibrium strategies prescribe truthful name announcement, a description of how
Γi,−i is played will complete the speciﬁcation of strategies on the equilibrium path for the
supergame.
Play of Game Γi,−i:
For ease of exposition, ﬁx player i and a rival name −i. Play is speciﬁed in an identical manner
for each rival name. For the rest of the section (since rival name −i is ﬁxed), to save on notation
I denote player i’s private histories ˆ ht
i,−i in the pairwise game Γi,−i by ˆ ht
i. Recall that a t-period
history denoted by ˆ ht
i speciﬁes the action proﬁles played in the last t periods of this game Γi,−i,
and not in the last t calendar time periods.11 Since in equilibrium, any history ˆ ht
i of Γi,−i has
11A period in Γi,−i is really an interaction between player i and name −i. So, when I refer to Γi,−i, I use
“interaction” and “period” interchangeably.
17the same name proﬁle in each period, we ignore the names while specifying how Γi,−i is played
on the equilibrium path.
The pairwise game Γi,−i proceeds in blocks of T periods (Later we deﬁne T).
In the ﬁrst period of every block (plan period), the action proﬁle used by players i and −i
serves as a coordination device to determine play for the rest of the block. Partition the set
of i’s actions into two non-empty subsets Gi and Bi. Let ∆(Gi) and ∆(Bi) denote the set of
mixtures of actions in Gi and Bi respectively. If player i chooses an action from set Gi, she is
said to send plan Pi = G. Otherwise she is said to send plan Pi = B.
Further, choose any four pure action proﬁles g,b,x,y ∈ A such that gi  = bi ∀i ∈ {1,2}.
Deﬁne a function ψ : A → {g,b,x,y} (the signatures) mapping one-period histories (or a pair
of plans) to one of the action proﬁles as follows.
ψ(a) =

      
      
g if a ∈ G1 × G2,
b if a ∈ B1 × B2,
x if a ∈ G1 × B2,
y if a ∈ B1 × G2.

















,a ∈ Pi × G,
si[ˆ h1
i] = ψi([ˆ h1
i]) and si[ˆ ht
i] = a
P2,P1
i ,t ≥ 2
 
.
Note that the set of action plans in Si restricts player i’s actions if her rival announced plan G.
In particular, action plans in Si prescribe that player i use the correct signature and play a
P2,P1
i
if the announced plans were (P1,P2). Si does not restrict the plan that player i can announce
in the plan period or her play if her rival announced a B plan or her play after any deviations.
In equilibrium, in any T-period block of a pairwise game, players will choose action plans
from Si. Players will use in fact one of two actions plans from Si, a favorable one which I
denote by sG
i and an unfavorable one which I denote by sB
i . These are deﬁned below.
Deﬁne partially a favorable action plan sG
i such that
sG
i [∅] ∈ ∆(Gi),
sG
i [ˆ h1























18Similarly, partially deﬁne an unfavorable action plan sB
i such that
sB
i [∅] ∈ ∆(Bi),
sB
i [ˆ h1





















































,a ∈ Pi × P−i,a′




Note that both action plans sG
i and sB
i belong to Si. sG
i is an action plan in Si that prescribes
sending a G plan at the start of a block. sB
i prescribes sending plan B at the start of a block and
minmaxing when i’s rival is the ﬁrst to deviate from the plan proposed in the plan period. For
any history not included in the deﬁnitions of sG
i and sB
i above, prescribe the actions arbitrarily.
Why do we call sG
i favorable and sB
i unfavorable? Suppose player 1 uses action plan sG
1 , her
rival, player 2 gets a payoﬀ strictly higher than ¯ v2 in each period, except possibly in the ﬁrst
two periods. This is because as long as player 1 plays sG
1 , the payoﬀ to player 2 that is realized
in any period except the ﬁrst two is approximately wBG
2 or wGG
2 both of which are higher than
¯ v2. Further, if player 1 plays sB
1 , player 2 gets a payoﬀ strictly lower than v2 in all except at
most two periods. In the plan period and in the ﬁrst period where player 2 decides to deviate,




of which are strictly lower than v2.
It is therefore possible to choose T large enough so that for some δ < 1, for all δ > δ,
i’s average payoﬀ within the T-period block from any action plan si ∈ Si against sG
−i strictly
exceeds ¯ v1 and her average payoﬀ from using any action plan si ∈ ST
i against sB
−i is strictly
below v1. Assume from here on that δ > δ.
Finally, I deﬁne two benchmark action plans which are used later to compute continuation
payoﬀs for every possible history within a block. Deﬁne rG
i ∈ Si to be an action plan such that
given any history ˆ ht
i, rG
i |ˆ ht
i gives the lowest payoﬀs against sG
−i among all action plans in Si.
Deﬁne rB
i ∈ ST
i to be an action plan such that given any history ˆ ht
i, rB
i |ˆ ht
i gives the highest
payoﬀs against sB
−i among all action plans in ST










−i → R is the payoﬀ function in the T-fold ﬁnitely
19repeated game, where UT( ) is the appropriately discounted and normalized sum of stage-game
payoﬀs.
Now we are equipped to specify how player i plays her pairwise game Γi,−i. We call this i’s
“partial strategy”.
Partial Strategies: Speciﬁcation of Play in Γi,−i
• Initial Period of Γi,−i: In the ﬁrst ever period when player i meets player −i, player i
plays sG
i with probability  0 and sB
i with probability (1 −  0) where  0 solves
v−i =  0¯ v−i + (1 −  0)v−i.
Note that since (1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i < v−i < ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i, we have  0,1 −  0 ≥ ǫ.
• Plan Period of a Non-Initial Block of Γi,−i: If player i ever observed a deviation
in a signature period of an earlier block in any pairwise game, she plays strategy sB
i
with probability (1 − βl) where l is the number of deviations she has seen so far (in the
supergame) and β > 0 is small.
Otherwise, she plays strategy sG
i with probability   and sB
i with probability (1− ) where
the mixing probability   is chosen to tailor player −i’s continuation payoﬀ.
How are continuation payoﬀs determined? Continuation payoﬀs are speciﬁed in a way that
makes each player indiﬀerent between all action plans in ST
i when her opponent plays sB
−i
and indiﬀerent between all action plans in Si when her opponent plays sG
−i. The average
payoﬀ from playing any action plan in ST
i against the opponent’s play of sB
−i is adjusted
to be exactly vi. Similarly, the average payoﬀ from playing any action plan in Si against
the opponent’s play of sG
−i is adjusted to be exactly ¯ vi. This is done as follows.
Let c denote the current calendar time period, and let c(τ), τ ∈ {1,...,T} denote the
calendar time period of the τth stage of the most recently elapsed block in the pairwise
game Γi,−i.
For any history ˆ hT
i observed (at calendar period c) by i in the most recently elapsed block,
if sB

















τ MT−τ+1 if c − c(τ) = T + 1 − τ
0 otherwise,
20and θB
τ is the diﬀerence between −i’s continuation payoﬀ in the last block from playing
rB
−i from period τ on and −i’s continuation payoﬀ from playing the action observed by i at
τ followed by reversion to rB
−i from (τ +1) on. Since rB
−i gives i maximal payoﬀs, θB
τ ≥ 0.
Player i chooses   ∈ (0,1) to solve  ¯ v−i + (1 −  )v−i = v−i + (1 − δ)ωB
−i(ˆ hT
i ). Since T is
ﬁxed, we can make (1 − δ)ωB
−i(ˆ hT
i ) arbitrarily small, for large enough δ, and so the above
continuation payoﬀ will be feasible.
It is worthwhile to note how these rewards make player −i indiﬀerent between all action
plans in ST
−i when her opponent plays sB
i . Suppose at some stage τ of a block, player −i
plays an action that gives her a payoﬀ in the current period that is lower than that from
playing rB
−i. With probability ( 1
M)T+1−τ her next plan period with player i will be exactly
T + 1 − τ calendar periods later, and in that case, she will receive a proportionately high
reward θB
τ MT+1−τ. If her next plan period is not exactly T +1−τ periods later, she does
not get compensated. However, in expectation, for any action that she may choose, the loss
she will suﬀer today (compared to the benchmark action plan rB
−i) is exactly compensated
by the reward she will get in the future.
If sG

















τ }MT−τ+1 if c − c(τ) = T + 1 − τ
0 otherwise,
and θG
τ is the diﬀerence between −i’s continuation payoﬀ within the last block from playing
rG
−i from time τ on and −i’s continuation payoﬀ from playing the action observed by i at
period τ followed by reversion to rG
−i from τ + 1 on. Since rG
−i gives −i minimal payoﬀs,
θG
τ ≤ 0 for all actions are used by strategies in S−i.
Player i chooses   ∈ (0,1) to solve  ¯ v−i +(1− )v−i = ¯ v−i +(1−δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ). Again, since
T is ﬁxed, we can make (1 − δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ) arbitrarily small, for large enough δ. We restrict









i ) > (1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i − ¯ v−i.
• Signature Period and other Non-initial Periods: Players use the designated sig-
nature ψ(a) if a was the proﬁle realized in the plan period of the block. For the rest of
21the block, they play according to the announced plan (i.e. if the announced plans were
(P1,P2), then they play action proﬁle aP2,P1).
This completes the speciﬁcation of strategies on the equilibrium path.
3.2.3 Beliefs of Players
At any private history, each player believes that in every period, she met the true owner of the
name she encountered, and that no player has ever misreported her name.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, I show that the above strategies and beliefs constitute a sequential equilibrium.
Here I prove sequential rationality of strategies on the equilibrium path. This is done in two
steps. First, conditional on truthful reporting of names, the actions prescribed are shown to be
optimal. Second, I show that it is incentive compatible to report one’s name truthfully. The
proof of sequential rationality oﬀ the equilibrium path and consistency of beliefs is relegated to
the appendix.
As before, ﬁx a player i and a rival −i. The partial strategy for player i in pairwise game
Γi,−i can be represented by an automaton that revises actions and states in every plan period
of Γi,−i.
Set of States: The set of states of a player i is the set of continuation payoﬀs for her rival −i
and is the interval [(1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i,ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i].
Initial State: Player i’s initial state is the target payoﬀ for her rival v−i.
Decision Function: When player i is in state u, she uses strategy sG
i with probability   and
sB
i with probability (1 −  ) where   solves
u =  
 
ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i
 
+ (1 −  )
 
(1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i
 
.
Transition Function: For any history ˆ hT
i in the last T-period block for player i, if the action
played was sG
i then at the end of the block, the state transits to ¯ v−i + (1 − δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ). If
the realized action was sB
i the new state is v−i + (1 − δ)ωB
−i(ˆ hT
i ). Recall that for δ large
enough, (1 − δ)ωB
−i(ˆ hT
i ) and (1 − δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ) can be made arbitrarily small, which ensures that
the continuation payoﬀ always lies within the interval [(1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i, ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i].
It can be easily seen that given i’s strategy, any strategy of player −i whose restriction
belongs to S−i is a best response. The average payoﬀ within a block from playing rG
−i against
22sG
i is exactly ¯ v−i, and that from playing rB
−i against sB
i is v−i. Moreover, the continuation
payoﬀs are also ¯ v−i and v−i respectively. Any player’s payoﬀ is therefore  0¯ v−i + (1 −  0)v−i.
Note also that each player is indiﬀerent between all action plans in ST
i when her opponent plays
sB
−i.
It remains to verify that players will truthfully report their names in equilibrium. First I
show that if a player impersonates someone else in her community, irrespective of what action
she chooses to play, she can get detected (i.e. with positive probability, someone in her rival
community will become aware that some deviation has occurred). Then, the detector will punish
the whole community of the impersonator. For suﬃciently patient players, this threat is enough
to deter impersonation.
At any calendar time t, deﬁne the state of play between any pair of players to be k ∈
{1,...,T} where k is the stage of the current block they are playing in their pairwise game (e.g.
for a plan period, k = 1). At time (t+1), they will either transit to state k+1 with probability
1
M , if they happen to meet again in the next calendar time period or remain in state k. Suppose
at time t, player i1 decides to impersonate i2. Player i1 can form beliefs over the possible states
of each of her rivals j,j ∈ {1,...,M} with respect to i2, conditional on her own private history.
Denote player i1’s beliefs over the states of any pair of players by a vector (p1,...,pn).
Fix a member j of the rival community, whom player i1 can be matched to in the next
period. Suppose player i1 has met the sequence of names {j1,...,jt−1}. For any t ≥ 2, her
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1 if j = jτ,
0 otherwise.
To see how we obtain the above expression, note that player i1 knows that in periods when
she met rival j, it is not possible that player i2 also met j. Hence, she knows with certainty
23that in these periods the state of play between players i2 and j did not change. She believes
that in other periods, the state of play would have changed according the transition matrix H.
This gives the product term in the above expression. For any given calendar period τ, player
i1 can also use this information to compute the expected state of players i2 and j conditioning
on the event that i2 and j met for the ﬁrst time ever in period τ. For any τ, the probability








Finally, player i1 knows that the pair i2 and j could not have met for the ﬁrst time in a period
that she met j herself, and so needs to condition only on such periods when she did not meet j.
Notice that the transition matrix H is irreducible and
lim
q→∞









Further it can be easily shown that the following is true.
∀q ≥ 1, [(1,0,...,0)   H
q]2 > 0, (3)
where [(1,0,...,0)   H
q]2 represents the 2
nd component of (1,0,...,0)   H
q
It follows from (2) and (3) that for any rival j whom i1 has not met at least in one period,
there exists a lower bound φ > 0 such that the probability of j being in state 2 with i2 is at
least φ.
Now, when player i1 announces name i2, she does not know which rival she will end up
meeting that period. It follows that at t ≥ 2, player i1 assigns probability at least
φ
M(M−1) to
the event that the rival she meets is in state 2 with i2. (To see why, pick a rival j′ whom i1 did
not meet in the ﬁrst calendar time period (t = 1). With probability 1
M, at time t, i1 will meet
this j′ and with probability 1
M−1 this j′ would have met i2 at t = 1 and period t could be their
signature period.)
Consequently, if player i1 announces her name to be i2, there is a minimal strictly positive
probability ǫ2 φ
M(M−1) that her impersonation gets detected. This is because if the rival she
meets is supposed to be in a signature period with i2, they should play one of the signatures
g,b,x,y depending on the realized plan in their plan period. Since players mix with probability
at least ǫ on both Plans G and B, player i1 will play the wrong signature with probability at
least ǫ2 irrespective of the action she chooses. Player i1’s rival will realize that some deviation
has occurred, and she will switch to the bad plan B (almost certainly) with each of the players
in i1’s community in their next plan period.
24Player i1 will not misreport her name if her maximal potential gain from deviating is not
greater than the minimal expected loss in continuation payoﬀ from detection.




δ + M(1 − δ)
 
γ.
Note that because of the random matching process, the eﬀective discount factor for any player
in her pairwise games is not δ, but higher, i.e. δ
δ+M(1−δ).
Player i1’s minimal expected loss in continuation payoﬀ from impersonation is given by






δ + M(1 − δ)
 T
[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
To derive the above expression, observe that there is a minimal probability
φ
M(M−1) that
players j and i2 are in a signature period. Conditional on this event, irrespective of the action
i1 plays, there is a minimal probability ǫ2 that her deviation gets detected by her rival, j. Con-
ditional on detection, player j will switch to playing the unfavorable strategy with probability
(1 − β) in the next plan period with i1. At best, i1 and j’s plan period is (T − 1) periods
away, after which i1’s payoﬀ in her pairwise game with j will drop from the target payoﬀ vi to
(1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi.
i1 will not impersonate if her maximal current gain is outweighed by her loss in continuation












δ + M(1 − δ)
 T
[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
For δ close enough to 1, this inequality is satisﬁed, and so misreporting one’s name is not a
proﬁtable deviation at any t ≥ 2.
Now consider incentives for truth-telling in the ﬁrst period of the supergame. Suppose i1
impersonates i2 and meets rival j. In the next period, with probability ǫ
2
M, i2 will meet j and
use the wrong signature, thus informing j that someone has deviated. By a similar argument
as above, if δ is high enough, i1’s potential current gain will be outweighed by the future loss in
continuation payoﬀ. ￿
The interested reader may refer to the appendix for a formal proof of the consistency of
beliefs and sequential rationality oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Remark 1 General Matching Technologies: A distinguishing feature of this result is that
unlike earlier literature, it does not depend on the random matching being independent or
25uniform. The assumption of uniform independent matching is made only for convenience. The
construction continues to work for more general matching technologies. For instance it is enough
to assume that for each player, the probability of being matched to each rival is strictly positive
and the expected time until she meets each of her rivals again is bounded.
Remark 2 Generalizable to Asymmetric Payoﬀs: In this result, I restrict attention to the
case where all members of a speciﬁc community get identical payoﬀs. With the same equilibrium
strategies, it is possible to also achieve other asymmetric payoﬀproﬁles (vi1,...,viM,vj1,...,vjM)
with the property that for all possible pairs of rivals i and j, (vi,vj) ∈ int(F∗). Clearly, the
feasibility of asymmetric payoﬀ proﬁles does depend on the speciﬁcs of the matching process, in
particular on the probability of meeting each rival.
Remark 3 Asymmetric Discount Factors: Unlike in earlier work (e.g. Ellison (1994)),
the assumption of a common discount factor for all players is not necessary for the equilibrium
construction of this paper.
3.4 Small Communities (M = 2)
An important feature that enables the above construction is that at any time, each player is
uncertain about the states that the other players are in with respect to each other. This source
of uncertainty ensures that if a player wants to impersonate somebody, she believes that she will
get detected. This is no longer the case if we consider communities with just two members each.
Since each players knows the sequence of names she has met, she knows the sequence of names
her rivals have met (conditional on truthful revelation). So, each player knows with certainty
which period of a block any pair of her rivals is in. Since the states of one’s opponents’ play are
no longer random, the above construction does not apply.
In this section, I show that with some modiﬁcation to the strategies, every feasible and
individually rational payoﬀ is still achievable.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Construction
As before, play proceeds in blocks of T interactions between any pair of players, but now each
block starts with “initiation periods”. The ﬁrst ever interaction between any two players is
called their “game initiation period”. In this period, the players play a coordination game.
26They each play two given actions (say a1 and a2 for player 1 and b1 and b2 for player 2) with
equal probability. If the realized action proﬁle is not (a1,b1), the game is said to be initiated
and players continue to play as described below. If the realized action proﬁle is (a1,b1), players
replay the game initiation period. Once the pairwise game is initiated, it proceeds as before in
blocks of T periods. Any new block of play also starts with similar initiation periods. In a block
initiation period, players play as described above. If the realized proﬁle is not (a1,b1), they
start playing their block action plans from the next period. Otherwise, they play the initiation
period again. Once a block is initiated, play within the block proceeds exactly as in the earlier
construction, i.e. players start the block with a plan period followed by a signature period and
then play according to the announced plan of the block. Since the pairwise game after initiation
is exactly the same as in the earlier construction, I omit a detailed description here.
The initiation periods ensure that no player can know precisely what state her rivals are in
with respect to each other. In particular, no player knows whether a given period is a signature
period for any pair of her rivals. Further, no player outside a pair can observe the action
realized in the plan period, and so is unaware of the sequence of actions that is being played.
Consequently, if anyone outside a pair tries to impersonate one of the members of the pair, she
can end up playing the wrong action in case it is a signature period and thus get detected. If
a deviation is detected, the detector punishes the entire rival community by switching to the
unfavorable strategy with every rival in the next plan period. This threat is enough to deter
deviation if players are suﬃciently patient.
Since the construction is quite similar, the details of the proof are relegated to the appendix.
3.5 Cooperation within a Single Community
In many applications, it may be reasonable to assume that there is only one large community
of players who interact repeatedly with each other, possibly in diﬀerent roles. For example,
consider a large community of traders over the internet, where people are repeatedly involved in
a two-player game between a buyer and a seller. It is conceivable that no player is just a seller
or just a buyer. Players switch roles in the trading relationship in each period, but each time
play a trading game against another trader in the community. Can cooperation be sustained in
this slightly altered environment?
It turns out that the same equilibrium construction works for a single community of agents.
Any feasible and individually rational payoﬀ can be sustained in equilibrium within a single
27community of players in the same way, using the idea of community responsibility. To see
how, consider a community of M players, being randomly matched in every period and playing
a two-player stage-game. For ease of exposition, think of a two-player trading game played
between a buyer and a seller. Suppose players are paired randomly each period, and a public
randomization device determines the roles within each pair. (Say, players are designated buyers
and sellers with equal probability).
Each player now plays one set of games as a buyer against (M − 1) sellers and another set
of games as a seller against (M −1) buyers. She tracks continuation payoﬀs separately for each
possible opponent in exactly the same way as before. Now she treats the same name in a buyer
role and a seller role separately. If a player detects a deviation as a seller (or buyer), she switches
to a bad mood against all buyers (or sellers) at the earliest possible opportunity (i.e. at the
start of a new T-period block with each opponent).
An interesting observation is that a single community actually facilitates detection of imper-
sonations. If a player misreports her name, with positive probability she will meet the real owner
of her reported name, and in this case her rival will know with certainty that an impersonation
has occurred. This feature can be used to simplify the equilibrium strategies, and eliminate the
need for special signature periods.
4 Community Responsibility with Multiple Communities
So far, we have analyzed the interaction between two communities of agents who repeatedly
play a two-player game and shown that a Folk Theorem holds if players are suﬃciently pa-
tient. This section establishes that the result generalizes to situations with random multilateral
matching where K > 2 communities interact repeatedly. Agents from K diﬀerent communities
are randomly matched to form groups of K players each (called “playgroups”). Players ﬁrst
simultaneously introduce themselves, and then play a simultaneous move K-player stage-game.
It turns out it is still possible to achieve any individually rational feasible interior payoﬀ through
community responsibility.
How does community responsibility work when there are multiple communities? In the
two-player case, each player keeps track of her rival’s continuation payoﬀ. Her own strategy is
independent of her own continuation payoﬀ, which is controlled by her rival. With K players,
the challenge is that we need to ensure that each player can control the payoﬀs of all her rivals
28simultaneously. This problem is resolved by making each community keep track of exactly one
other community. The construction can be summarized as follows.
Every player tracks separately her play with every possible K player group she could be
in. Play within any playgroup proceeds in blocks of T periods. Each community k acts as the
monitor of one other community, say its successor community k + 1 (community K’s successor
is community 1). At the beginning of each block, each player uses one of two continuation
strategies. She is indiﬀerent between them, but the strategy she chooses determines whether
the continuation payoﬀ of the player of her successor community in that playgroup is high or
low. So, each player’s payoﬀ is tracked by her monitor in a playgroup. The monitor randomizes
between her two strategies at the start of each block in a way to ensure that the target payoﬀ of
her successor is achieved. As before, conditional on truthful announcement of names, these types
of strategies can be used to attain cooperative outcomes. As in the case of two communities,
community responsibility is used to ensure truthful announcement of names. If any player
deviates from the equilibrium strategies, she can be punished in two ways. First, the members
of her speciﬁc playgroup can minmax her. Second, her monitor can hold her whole community
responsible and punish the community by switching to the unfavorable strategy with all her
playgroups at the start of the next block.
4.1 Model and Result
Multilateral Matching: There are K communities of agents with M > 2 members in each
community I, I ∈ {1,...,K}. In each time period t ∈ {1,2,...}, agents are randomly matched
into groups of K members each, with one member from each community. Let G−k denote
a group of (K − 1) players with members from all except the kth community. Let mt(G−k)
denote the member of the kth community who is matched to the group G−k. Matches are made
independently and uniformly over time, i.e. ∀ histories, ∀j ∈ community k,Pr[j = mt(G−k)] =
1
M . For any player i, the set of rivals she is matched with (say G−i) is said to constitute
her playgroup. After being matched, players announce their names. However, names are not
veriﬁable. Then, they play the K-player stage-game.
Stage-Game and Message Sets: As in the model with two communities, each community
has a directory of names NI : I ∈ {1,...,K} with M names each. A name proﬁle of a playgroup
is denoted by ν ∈ N := N1 × ... × NK. Let ∆(NI) denote the set of mixtures of messages in
NI. The stage-game Γ has ﬁnite action sets AI,I ∈ {1,...,K}. Denote an action proﬁle by
29a ∈ A :=
 
I AI. The set of mixtures of actions in AI is denoted by ∆(AI). Stage-game payoﬀs
are given by a function u : A → RK. Deﬁne F to be the convex hull of the payoﬀ proﬁles that can
be achieved by pure action proﬁles in the stage-game. Formally, F := conv({u(a) : a ∈ A}). As
before, denote the feasible and individually rational payoﬀ set by F∗ := {v ∈ F : vi > v∗
i ∀i},
where v∗
i is the mixed action minmax value for player i. We consider games where F∗ has
non-empty interior (IntF∗  = ∅). Let γ be also deﬁned as before. All players have a common
discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
Information Assumption: Players can observe only the transactions they are personally
engaged in. So each player knows the names that she encountered in her playgroup in each
period and the action proﬁles played in that playgroup. She does not know the true identity of
her partners. She does not know the composition of other playgroups or how play proceeds in
them.
The deﬁnitions of histories, strategies, action plans and sequential equilibrium can be easily
extended to this setting in a way analogous to Section 2.
Theorem 2 (Folk Theorem for Random Multilateral Matching Games) Consider a ﬁnite K-
player game being played by K > 2 communities of M members each in a random matching
setting. For any (v1,...,vK) ∈ Int(F∗), there exists a sequential equilibrium that achieves
payoﬀs (v1,...,vK) in the inﬁnitely repeated random matching game with names with KM
players, if players are suﬃciently patient.
The equilibrium construction in the K-community case is similar to the two community case. So
the formal speciﬁcation of strategies and the proof of Theorem 2 are relegated to the appendix.
5 Conclusion
In games where large communities transact with each other, it is reasonable to assume that
players change partners over time, they do not recognize each other or have very limited in-
formation about each other’s actions. This paper investigates whether it is possible to achieve
all individually rational and feasible payoﬀs in equilibrium in such anonymous transactions. To
answer this question, I consider a repeated two-player game being played by two communities
of agents. In every period, each player is randomly matched to another player from the rival
community and the pair plays the two-player stage-game. Players do not recognize each other.
30Further, they observe only the transactions they are personally involved in. I examine what
payoﬀs can be sustained in equilibrium in this setting of limited information availability.
I obtain a strong possibility result by allowing players to announce unveriﬁable messages in
every period. The main result is a Folk Theorem which states that for any two-player game
played between two communities, it is possible to sustain all feasible individually rational payoﬀs
in a sequential equilibrium, provided players are suﬃciently patient. Though cooperation in
anonymous random matching games has been studied before, little was known about games
other than the prisoner’s dilemma. This paper is an attempt to ﬁll this gap in the literature.
Earlier literature has shown that though eﬃciency can be achieved in a repeated PD with
no information transmission, with any other game, transmission of hard information seems
necessary. Kandori (1992) assumes the existence of labels - players who have deviated or faced
deviation can be distinguished from those who have not, by their labels. Takahashi (2007)
assumes that players know the full history of past actions of her rival. To the best of my
knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to obtain a general Folk Theorem without adding any hard
information in the model. Though players can announce names, it is unveriﬁable cheap talk.
An interesting feature of the strategies I use is that cooperation is not achieved by the
customary community enforcement. In most settings with anonymous transactions, cooperation
is sustained by implementing third-party sanctions. A player who deviates is punished by other
people in the society, not necessarily by the victim. Here, cooperation is sustained by community
responsibility. A player who deviates is punished only by the victim, but the victim holds the
deviator’s entire community responsible and punishes the whole community. It is this alternate
form of punishment that allows us to obtain the Folk Theorem in a setting with such limited
information.
An appealing feature of the equilibrium in this paper is that unlike earlier work, the construc-
tion applies to quite general matching technologies, and does not require uniform or independent
matching. I also show that the Folk Theorem extends to a setting with multiple communities
playing a K-player stage-game.
A question that remains unanswered in this paper is whether cooperation can be achieved in
a general game with even less information than is used here. Can we obtain a Folk Theorem for
general games without any transmission of information? If not, what is the minimal information
transmission which will enable impersonal exchange between two large communities? This is
the subject of future work.
316 Appendix
6.1 Sequential Equilibrium
Section 3.3 establishes optimality of strategies on the equilibrium path. Below, I prove sequential
rationality oﬀ the equilibrium path and the consistency of beliefs. Strategies on the equilibrium
path were speciﬁed in Section 3.2. Oﬀ-equilibrium strategies are deﬁned as follows.
• ∀i,∀t,∀ht




In other words, after any complete private history including those in which they observed
a deviation (own or other), players report their name truthfully,
• ∀kt
i = {(ν1,a1),...,(νt−1,at−1),νt} ∈ K t
i with νt
i = i and ντ
i  = i for some τ, player i
plays the partial strategy for pairwise game Γi,j where νt
−i = j.
In other words, at any t-period interim private history in which a player has misreported
her name in at least one period, but has reported truthfully in the current period, she
plays game Γi,−i according to the partial strategy against the current rival name.
• ∀kt
i = {(ν1,a1),...,(νt−1,at−1),νt} ∈ K t
i with νt
i  = i, σ∗[kt
i] = argmaxai∈Ai Ui(ai,σ∗
−i|ξi[kt
i]).
In other words, at any t-period interim private history in which a player has misreported
her name in the current period, she plays the action that maximizes her expected utility
given her beliefs and her rivals’ equilibrium strategies.
• At any t-period interim private history in which a player has deviated by playing the wrong
action, i.e. ∀kt
i = {(ν1,a1),...,(νt−1,at−1),νt} ∈ K t
i with aτ
i  = σ∗
i [kτ




−i was in the unfavorable state (playing sB
−i), player i should play her best response
to the minmax strategy of her opponent for the rest of the block, and then revert to
playing her partial strategy for her game Γi,−i against this rival.
– If ντ
−i was in the favorable state (playing sG
−i), player i should continue playing sG
−i
for the rest of the block and revert to playing her partial strategy for her game Γi,−i
against this rival.
Optimality of Actions:
Lemma 1 For any player i, misreporting ones name is not optimal after any history.
32Proof: Fix a player i. The proof of the Folk Theorem establishes optimality on the equilibrium
path. So now consider any information set of player i reached oﬀ the equilibrium path, possibly
after one or more deviations (impersonations or deviations in action) by player i herself or others.
We compare i’s payoﬀs if she truthfully reports her name to her payoﬀs if she impersonates
someone.
Consider the play between i and any rival name j who has observed d deviations so far. By






δ + M(1 − δ)
 
γ.
However, by impersonating i′, player i increases the probability with which j will punish in
case her deviation is detected. Player i’s minimal expected loss in continuation payoﬀ from the
deviation is given by the following.











d+1)[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
To see how we obtain this expression, note that there is a minimal probability
φ
M(M−1) that
j and i′ are supposed to be in a signature period. Conditional on this event, irrespective of
what action i plays, there is a minimal probability ǫ2 that her rival j will learn of a deviation.
Conditional on detection, player j will switch to the unfavorable action plan with probability
(1−βd+1) in the next plan period, instead of (1−βd). At best, i and j’s plan period is (T −1)
periods away, after which i’s payoﬀ in her pairwise game with j will drop from the target payoﬀ
vi to (1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi. (As before, in the pairwise game between i and j, the eﬀective discount
factor is not δ but higher, i.e. δ
δ+M(1−δ).)
So, player i will not misreport her name if the maximal gain from deviating is outweighed













δ + M(1 − δ)
 T
βd(1 − β)[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
It can be seen that the above inequality holds for suﬃciently large δ. Hence, at any information
set oﬀ the equilibrium path, i does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to misreport her name. ￿
This establishes that the strategies are optimal, since conditional on truthful reporting of
names, it is optimal to play the speciﬁed actions.
Consistency of Beliefs:
For any player i, perturb the strategies as follows. (Fix η > 0 small.)




et ) and announces an incorrect name with complementary probability
(randomizing uniformly between other possible names).
• At any interim t-period private history, player i plays the equilibrium action with prob-
ability (1 − η
1
2t ). She plays other actions with complementary probability (randomizing
uniformly across the other possible actions).
Now, consider any t-period complete private history of player i. We will show that she
believes with probability 1 that there have been no impersonations in the past.
Any observed history is consistent with the sequence of events that there have been no
impersonations but only deviations in action. Consider the sequence of events of no imperson-
ations and t deviations in action. If this sequence is consistent with the observed history, the















2n is bounded above by 1, it follows that the probability of any number of deviations
in action is bounded below by η(1 −η). Hence any sequence of events with no name deviations







Further, we can show that the above expression is bounded below by a constant κ uniformly in


























es) converges.12 Since the inﬁnite product converges, there exists a constant κ such that





es ) ≥ η(1 − η)κ.
12This follows from the result that for un ∈ [0,1),
Q∞
n=1(1 − un) > 0 ⇐⇒
P∞
n=1 un < ∞. (See Rudin: Real and
Complex Analysis)
34Now we analyze sequences of events which are consistent with the observed history and which
involve at least one impersonation.






























































Hence the probability of the sequences of events that are consistent with the observed history
and involve any impersonations is given by P :=
 t
l=1 P(l). Collecting terms diﬀerently (in



































The ﬁrst inequality follows from two observations. First, any term with a given power of e, say
em, can belong to a sequence of events with at most
√
2m impersonations. Second, if there i
impersonations in m periods, there are less than mi ways in which this can occur.
The series
 
am in expression (5) is convergent. Denote the limit by Λ. Convergence follows









Hence, for any t, P < η2Λ.
Given any observed history ht
i of player i, by Bayes’ Rule, the probability i assigns to a
consistent sequence of events with no impersonations is given by




η(1 − η)κ + η2Λ
.
As η → 0, the above expression approaches 1 uniformly for all t. In other words, as perturbations
vanish, after any history player i believes that with probability 1 there were no impersonations
in the past. ￿
6.2 Proof of Folk Theorem for Small Communities (M = 2)
Consider any payoﬀ proﬁle (v1,v2) ∈ IntF∗. We proceed just as in the equilibrium construction
of Theorem 1. Pick payoﬀ proﬁles wGG,wGB,wBG,wBB such that the following conditions hold
1. wGG
i > vi > wBB
i ∀i ∈ {1,2}.
2. wGB
1 > v1 > wBG
1 .
3. wBG
2 > v2 > wGB
2 .
These inequalities imply that there exists vi and ¯ vi with v∗
i < vi < vi < ¯ vi such that the rect-
angle [v1, ¯ v1] × [v2, ¯ v2] is completely contained in the interior of conv({wGG,wGB,wBG,wBB})
and further ¯ v1 < min{wGG
1 ,wGB
1 }, ¯ v2 < min{wGG
1 ,wBG
1 }, v1 > max{wBB
1 ,wBG













N } such that each vector wXY , the average discounted payoﬀ vector over the se-
quence {aXY
1 ,...,aXY
N } satisﬁes the above relationships if δ is large enough.
Further, we can ﬁnd ǫ ∈ (0,1) small so that v∗
i < (1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi < vi < (1 − ǫ)¯ vi + ǫvi. In
what follows, when we refer to an action proﬁle aXY , we actually refer to the ﬁnite sequence of
action proﬁles {aXY
1 ,...,aXY
N } described above.
6.2.1 Deﬁning Strategies at Complete Histories: Name Announcements
At complete private histories, players report names truthfully, (i.e. ∀i,∀t,∀ht




6.2.2 Deﬁning Strategies at Interim Histories: Actions
Partitioning of Histories:
At any interim private history, each player i partitions her history into M separate histories
corresponding to each of her pairwise games Γi,−i. If her current rival name is j, she plays game
Γi,j. Since equilibrium strategies prescribe truthful name announcement, a description o Γi,j
36will complete the speciﬁcation of strategies on the equilibrium path for the supergame.
Play of Game Γi,−i:
Fix player i and a name −i in i’s rival community. Play is speciﬁed in an identical manner
for each possible rival name. As before, we denote player i’s history in this pairwise game by
ˆ ht
i. The game Γi,−i between i and −i proceeds in blocks of T interactions, but with each block
starting with “initiation periods”.
Initiation Periods of Game Γi,−i: The ﬁrst ever interaction between two player i and −i
is called the “game initiation period”. In this period, player 1 (from community 1) plays two
given actions (say a1 and a2) with equal probability and player 2 (from community 2) plays
two actions (say b1 and b2) with equal probability. If the realized action proﬁle is not (a1,b1),
the game is said to be initiated and players continue to play as described below. If the realized
action proﬁle is (a1,b1), players replay the game initiation period. Once the game is initiated,
the game proceeds in blocks of T interactions. Any non-initial block of play also starts with
similar initiation periods. In a block initiation period, players play as described above. If the
realized proﬁle is not (a1,b1), they start playing their block action plans from the next period.
Otherwise, they play the initiation period again.
T-period Blocks in Γi,j: Once a block is initiated, players use block action plans just like
in the construction with M > 2 players. In the ﬁrst period (plan period) of a block, players i
and −i take actions which inform each other about the plan of play for the rest of the block.
Partition the set of i’s actions into two non-empty subsets Gi and Bi. If player i chooses an
action from set Gi, she is said to send plan Pi = G. Otherwise she is said to send plan Pi = B.
Further, choose any four pure action proﬁles g,b,x,y ∈ A such that gi  = bi ∀i ∈ {1,2}.
Deﬁne the signature function ψ : A → {g,b,x,y} mapping one-period histories to one of the
action proﬁles as follows.
ψ(a) =

      
      
g if a ∈ G1 × G2,
b if a ∈ B1 × B2,
x if a ∈ G1 × B2,
y if a ∈ B1 × G2.
Suppose the observed plans are (P1,P2).

















,a ∈ Pi × G,
si[ˆ h
1
i] = ψi([ˆ h
1




i ,t ≥ 2
 
.
37As before, in equilibrium, players will use actions plans from the above set. Each player uses
one of two actions plans sG
i and sB
I , just as before.






























Similarly, partially deﬁne an unfavorable action plan sB
i such that
sB





























∀t ≥ r > 1,∀ˆ ht

















a ∈ Pi × P−i,a′
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As before, it is possible to choose T large enough so that for some δ < 1, ∀δ > δ, i’s average
payoﬀ within the block from any action plan si ∈ Si against sG
−i strictly exceeds ¯ v1 and her
average payoﬀ from using any action plan si ∈ ST
i against sB
−i is strictly below v1. Assume from
here on that δ > δ.
Deﬁne the two benchmark action plans used to compute continuation payoﬀs. Let rG
i ∈ Si
be an action plan such that given any history ˆ ht
i, rG
i |ˆ ht
i gives the lowest payoﬀs against sG
−i
among all action plans in Si. Deﬁne rB
i ∈ ST




i gives the highest payoﬀs against sB
−i among all action plans in ST
i . Redeﬁne ¯ v and v
so that Ui(rG
i ,sG
−i) = ¯ vi and Ui(rB
i ,sB
−i) = vi.
Partial Strategies: Speciﬁcation of Play in Γi,−i
The following describes how player i plays in the game Γi,−i. We call this i’s “partial strategy”.
• Game Initiation Period: Player i plays actions a1 and a2 and Player −i plays actions
b1 and b2 with equal probability.
38• Period following Game Initiation Period: If the realized action proﬁle is not (a1,b1),
the game is said to be initiated and players continue to play as described below. If the
realized action proﬁle is (a1,b1), players replay the initiation period in their next meeting.
• First Plan Period of Γi,−i: In the ﬁrst ever period that player i meets player −i after
their game is initiated, player i mixes between sG
i and sB
i in the following way.
– If the ﬁrst plan period of game Γi,−i occurs in the calendar period immediately fol-
lowing the ﬁrst initiation period of the game, and action proﬁle a was realized in the
initiation period, then player i plays sG
i with probability  0 and sB
i with probability






ρ(a) =  0¯ v−i + (1 −  0)v−i,
where ρ is the diﬀerence in player −i’s payoﬀ from the action proﬁle (a1,b1) and the
proﬁle a.
– Otherwise, player i plays sG
i with probability  0 and sB
i with probability (1 −  0),
where  0 solves
v−i =  0¯ v−i + (1 −  0)v−i,
For discount factor δ close enough to 1, the payoﬀs v−i and v−i + 1−δ
δ 4ρ both lie in the
interval [(1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i,ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i]. Henceforth, assume that δ is large enough.
Further, in both the above cases,  0,1 −  0 ≥ ǫ.
• Block Initiation Period: In the initiation period of a non-initial block, player i plays
actions a1 and a2 and Player −i plays actions b1 and b2 with equal probability.
• Period following Block Initiation Period: If the realized action proﬁle in the last
interaction was not (a1,b1), the next block is said to be initiated and players continue
to play as described below. If the realized action proﬁle is (a1,b1), players replay the
initiation period.
• Plan Period of a Non-Initial Block of Γi,−i: If player i ever observed a deviation in a
signature period of an earlier block, she plays strategy sB
i with probability (1−βl) where
l is the number of deviations she has seen so far and β > 0 is small.
Otherwise, she plays strategy sG
i with probability   and sB
i with probability (1− ) where
the mixing probability   is used to tailor player −i’s continuation payoﬀ, as shown below.
Let c be the current calendar time period, and c(τ), τ ∈ {1,...,T} denote the calendar
39time period of the τth period of the most recently elapsed block. For any history ˆ hT
i
observed (at calendar period c) by i in the most recently elapsed block, if sB
i was played

























3ρB(a) if c − c(τ) = T + 2 − τ
0 otherwise.
θB
τ is the diﬀerence between −i’s continuation payoﬀ in the last block from playing rB
−i
from time τ on and −i’s continuation payoﬀ from playing the action observed by i at
period τ followed by reversion to rB
−i from (τ +1) on, and ρB(a) is the diﬀerence between
the maximum possible one-period payoﬀ in the stage-game and player −i’s payoﬀ from
proﬁle a. Since rB
−i gives i maximal payoﬀs, θB
τ ≥ 0. Also by deﬁnition, ρB(a) ≥ 0.




























3ρG(a) if c − c(τ) = T + 1 − τ
0 otherwise,
θG
τ is the diﬀerence between −i’s continuation payoﬀ within the last block from playing
rG
−i from time τ on and −i’s continuation payoﬀ from playing the action observed by i at
period τ followed by reversion to rG
−i from τ +1 on and ρG(a) is the diﬀerence between the
minimum possible one-period payoﬀ in the stage-game and player −i’s payoﬀ from proﬁle
a. Since rG
−i gives −i minimal payoﬀs, θG
τ ≤ 0 for all actions are used by strategies in S−i.
By deﬁnition, ρG(a) ≥ 0.
Player i chooses   ∈ (0,1) to solve  ¯ v−i + (1 −  )v−i = ¯ v−i + (1 − δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ).
Note that since T is ﬁxed, we can make (1 − δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ) and (1 − δ)ωB
−i(ˆ hT
i ) arbitrarily
small, for large enough δ. We restrict attention to δ close enough to 1 so that
(1 − δ)ωB
−i(ˆ hT
i ) < ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i − v−i and (1 − δ)ωG
−i(ˆ hT
i ) > (1 − ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i − ¯ v−i.
40For such δ, the continuation payoﬀ at every period always lies within the interval [(1 −
ǫ)v−i + ǫ¯ v−i, ǫv−i + (1 − ǫ)¯ v−i].
• Signature Period and other Non-initial Periods: Players use the designated signa-
ture ψ(a) if a was the proﬁle realized in the plan period of the block. For the rest of the
block, they play according to the announced plan.
This completes the speciﬁcation of strategies on the equilibrium path.
6.2.3 Beliefs of Players
At any private history, each player believes that in every period, she met the true owners of the
names she encountered, and that no player ever misreported her name.
6.2.4 Proof of Equilibrium
First we show that conditional on truthful reporting of names, these strategies constitute an
equilibrium.
Note that any player i is indiﬀerent across her actions in the initiation period of a game
against any rival −i. This is because any gain that player i can get over her payoﬀ from proﬁle
a in the initiation period will be wiped out in expectation. With probability 3
8, she expects
to meet player −i again in the next calendar time period and initiate the game. In this case,
player −i will adjust her continuation payoﬀ to exactly oﬀset any gain or loss she made in the
initiation period.
Once the game is initiated, the strategies of any pair of players can be represented by an
automaton which revises actions and states in every plan period. The following describes the
automaton for any player −i.
Set of states: The set of states of a player −i is the set of continuation payoﬀs for her rival i
and is the interval [(1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi,ǫvi + (1 − ǫ)¯ vi].
Initial State: Player −i’s initial state is the target payoﬀ for her rival vi.
Decision Function: When −i is in state u, she uses sG
−i with probability   and sB
−i with
probability (1 −  ) where   solves u =  [ǫvi + (1 − ǫ)¯ vi] + (1 −  )[(1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi]
Transition Function: For any history ˆ hT
−i for player −i, if the realized action plan is sG
−i then
at the end of the block, the state transits to ¯ vi + (1 − δ)ωG
i (ˆ hT
−i). If the realized action plan is
sB
−i the new state is vi + (1 − δ)ωB
i (ˆ hT
−i).
41It can be easily seen that given −i’s action plan, any action plan of player i whose restriction
belongs to Si is a best response. The average payoﬀ within a block from playing rG
i against sG
−i
is exactly ¯ vi, and that from playing rB
i against sB
−i is vi. Moreover, the continuation payoﬀs are
also ¯ vi and vi respectively. Any player’s payoﬀ is therefore  0¯ vi + (1 −  0)vi.
Note that each player is indiﬀerent between all action plans in ST
i when her rival plays sB
−i.
At any stage τ of a block, player i believes that with probability 3
4(1
2)T+2−τ, her next plan period
with −i is exactly (T + 2 − τ) periods away, and in that case, for any action she chooses now
she will receive a proportionately high reward 4
3θB
τ 2T+2−τ. In expectation, any loss she suﬀers
today is exactly compensated for in the future. Similarly, in an initiation period of any block,
player i believes that with probability 3
8 that she will initiate the block in the next calendar
time period, and again for any action that she chooses now, she gets a proportionate reward /
punishment.
It remains to check if players will truthfully report their names. At any calendar time t,
deﬁne the state of play between any pair of players to be k ∈ {0,1...,T}, where k is the stage of
the current block they are in (with k=0 for the initiation period). Suppose at period t, player i1
impersonates i2 and meets rival j. Player i1 can form beliefs over the possible states that each
of her rivals j1 and j2 are in with respect to player i2, conditional on her own private history.
Based on her own history, i1 knows how many times her rivals have met. Suppose player i1
knows that player i2 has met rival j1 J1 times and met the other rival J2 times. Player i1 has
a belief over the possible states that j1 and i2 are in. Represent a player’s beliefs by a vector
(p0,...,pT).
For any t ≥ 2, player i1’s belief over the states of j1 and i2 is given by:
















4 0 0 0 ... 0
0 0 1 0 0 ... 0
0 0 0 1 0 ... 0
. . .
0 0 0 0 0 ... 1













To obtain the above expression, note that for any pair of players, conditional on meeting, if they
are in stage k = 0, they transit to state 1 with probability 3
4 and stay in the same state with
probability 1
4. Otherwise, in every meeting, they move to the next state. The transition matrix
42HJ1 is irreducible, and the limiting distribution is
lim
q→∞













Further, it can be easily shown that
∀q ≥ 3, [(1,0,...,0) Hq]3 > 0 where [(1,0,...,0) Hq]3 is the 3rd component of (1,0,...,0) Hq
It follows that for any rival j whom player i1 has not met in at least three periods in the past,
there is a lower bound φ > 0 such that the probability of j being in the signature period with
player i2 is at least φ. Now, when i1 announces the name i2, she does not know which rival she
will end up meeting. However, for any t ≥ 5, player i1 must assign probability at least φ to the
event that her rival is supposed to be in a signature period with i2. This is because at any t ≥ 5
there is at least one rival whom i1 has not met for three periods in the past. Consequently, if
she impersonates, there is a minimal strictly positive probability φǫ2 that her lie gets detected.
i1 will not impersonate i2 if her maximal gain is outweighed by the minimal expected loss from
deviation.




δ + 2(1 − δ)
 
γ.
Her expected loss in continuation payoﬀ is given by the following expression.
Minimal loss from deviation ≥ φǫ2(1 − β)
 
δ
δ + 2(1 − δ)
 T
[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].










δ + 2(1 − δ)
 T
[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
For δ close enough to 1, this inequality is satisﬁed and misreporting ones name is not a
proﬁtable deviation.
Now consider incentives for truthtelling at t ≤ 4. Suppose player i1 wants to impersonate
player i2 at t = 1. She believes that with probability 3
4 the game will get initiated in the current
period and with probability 1
4 the rival she meets now (say player j) will meet the true i2 in the
next two calendar time periods. In this case, irrespective of what player i2 plays at t = 3, with
probability ǫ, player j will become aware that a deviation occurred. In other words, at t = 1,
player i1 believes that with probability 3ǫ
16 her deviation will be detected at t = 3, and one of
her rivals will switch to her unfavorable strategy forever. By a similar argument as above, if δ
is high enough, player i1’s potential current gain from impersonation will be outweighed by the
long-term loss in continuation payoﬀ. Similar arguments apply for t = 2,3,4. ￿
436.3 Proof of Folk Theorem for Multilateral Matching
This section contains the formal equilibrium construction for the case of multiple communities.
6.3.1 Structure of Equilibrium
In equilibrium, players all report their names truthfully. Each player plays the prescribed equi-
librium strategies separately against each possible playgroup that she can be matched to. On
the equilibrium path, players condition play with a particular playgroup only on the history of
play vis-` a-vis that group of names. It is as if each player is playing separate but identical games
with MK−1 diﬀerent playgroups.
T-period Blocks: For any target payoﬀ proﬁle (v1,...,vK) ∈ int(F∗), we choose an appropri-
ate positive integer T. Play between members of any group of K players proceeds in blocks of T
periods. In a block each player i uses one of two action plans of the T-period ﬁnitely repeated
game. One of the action plans used by a player i ensures that player (i + 1) in that playgroup
cannot get more than vi+1, the target payoﬀ for i+1. The other action plan ensures that i+1
gets atleast vi+1. We call i the monitor of her successor (i + 1). (Player M monitors player
1.) In the plan period of a block, each player randomizes between the two action plans so as
to achieve the target payoﬀ of her successor in this playgroup. The action proﬁle played in the
plan period acts as a coordination device that informs the players of the plan of play for the
rest of the block for this group. At the next plan period, each player’s continuation payoﬀ is
again adjusted by her monitor based on the action proﬁles played in the last block with that
playgroup. Conditional on players reporting their names truthfully we show that the above form
of strategies constitute an equilibrium. Impersonations are detected and punished in a similar
way as before.
Detecting Impersonations: The second period of a block is designated as the signature pe-
riod and all players play actions that serve as their signatures. The signature used depends
on the action proﬁle realized in the plan period of the block. No player outside the speciﬁc
K-player group can observe the action in the plan period. Consequently, if anyone outside the
playgroup tries to impersonate one of the members, she can end up playing the wrong signature
in case it is a signature period, and so get detected.
Community Responsibility: If a player sees an incorrect action or signature, she knows that
someone has deviated, though the identity of the deviator or the nature of the deviation is
44unknown. (In fact every player in the playgroup knows that a deviation has occured.) The de-
viator’s entire community can be punished by the relevant monitor. The monitor just switches
to the bad action plan with every playgroup in their next plan period. Since every player is
indiﬀerent between her two action plans at the start of any block, the relevant monitor can
punish her successor’s entire community without adversely aﬀecting her own payoﬀ.
6.3.2 Preliminaries
Consider any payoﬀ proﬁle (v1,...,vK) ∈ Int(F∗). There exist 2K payoﬀ proﬁles wP such that
the following conditions hold.
1. wP
i > vi if Pi = G.
2. wP
i < vi if Pi = B.
These conditions imply that there exists vi and ¯ vi with v∗
i < vi < vi < ¯ vi such that the rectangle
[v1, ¯ v1]×...×[vK, ¯ vK] is contained in the interior of conv
  
wP : P = (P1,...,PK), Pi ∈ {G,B}
  
and further, for all i, ¯ vi < min{wP
i : Pi = G} and vi > max{wP
i : Pi = B}.
Now we can choose ﬁnite sequences of pure action proﬁles {aP
1 ,...,aP
N}, with P = (P1,...,PK),
Pi ∈ {G,B}, so that the vectors wP, the payoﬀs (average discounted) from the sequence of ac-
tion proﬁles {aP
n}N
n=1 for any plan proﬁle P satisfy the above relationships. As before, choose
ǫ ∈ (0,1) small so that v∗
i < (1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi < vi < (1 − ǫ)¯ vi + ǫvi




6.3.3 Name Announcements at Complete Histories
After any complete history (and the null history), players report their names truthfully.
6.3.4 Actions at Interim Histories
Partitioning of Histories:
At any interim private history, each player i partitions her history into MK−1 separate histories
corresponding to diﬀerent games (denoted by Γi,G−i) with each possible playgroup G−i. If her
current playgroup’s name proﬁle is G−i, she plays game Γi,G−i. Fix a player i and a playgroup
G−i. Below, I describe how game Γi,G−i is played. Let ˆ ht
i denote a t-period history in the game
ΓG−i. It speciﬁes the action proﬁles played in the last t interactions of i with the playgroup G−i.
45Play of Game Γi,G−i:
The game Γi,G−i between i and playgroup G−i proceeds in blocks of T periods. In the ﬁrst
period (the plan period) of a block, players take actions which inform their rivals about the
plan of play for the rest of the block. Partition the set of player i’s actions into two non-empty
subsets Gi and Bi. If player i chooses an action from set Gi, she is said to send plan Pi = G.
Otherwise she is said to send plan Pi = B.
Further, choose any two pure action proﬁles g,b ∈ A such that gi  = bi ∀i ∈ {1,...,K}.






g if ai ∈ Gi ∀i,
b if ai ∈ Bi ∀i.
Deﬁne ψ(.) arbitrarily otherwise. Suppose the observed plans are (P1,...,PK). Let ˜ P =
(PK,P1,...,PK−1).











,ai−1 ∈ Gi−1,si[ˆ h1
i] = ψ([ˆ h1
i]) and si[ˆ ht
i] = a
˜ P
i ∀t ≥ 1
 
.
Si includes action plans that prescribe playing the correct signature and playing according
to the plan announced in the plan period if ones monitor announced a favorable plan G, and
everyone in the playgroup used the correct signature and played as per the plan so far. In
equilibrium, players use action plans from the above set. Within a block, they use one of two
plans sG
i and sB
i which are deﬁned below.
Deﬁne partially a favorable action plan sG
i such that
sG




















We partially deﬁne an unfavorable action plan sB
i such that
sB
i [∅] ∈ ∆(Bi),
sB
i [ˆ h1


























, with j : a′










ji is i’s action in action proﬁle α∗
j which minmaxes player j, and
∀ˆ ht
i after ˆ h2
i = (a,a′), with j : a′
j  = ψj(a),a′





ji is i’s action in action proﬁle α∗
j which minmaxes player j.
For any history not included in the deﬁnitions of sG
i and sB
i above, prescribe the actions
arbitrarily. Given a plan proﬁle ˜ P, these strategies specify ψ(a) and a
˜ P until the ﬁrst unilateral
deviation. (In case of simultaneous deviations, these strategies also specify ψ(a) and a
˜ P.) If
a player j unilaterally deviates, then strategy sB
i speciﬁes that other players in her playgroup
minmax her.
Notice that if player i’s monitor (i−1) uses strategy sG
i−1, i gets a payoﬀ strictly more than
¯ vi in each period, except possibly the ﬁrst two periods. Further, if i’s monitor plays sB
i−1, player
i gets a payoﬀ strictly lower than vi in all except at most two periods. It is therefore possible
to choose T large enough so that for some δ < 1, ∀δ > δ, i’s average payoﬀ within the block
from any strategy si ∈ Si against sG
−i strictly exceeds ¯ v1 and her average payoﬀ from using any
strategy si ∈ ST
i against sB
−i is strictly below v1.
Now we deﬁne two benchmark action plans which are used to compute continuation payoﬀs.
For any sj ∈ {sG
j ,sB
j } deﬁne rG




i+1 gives player i + 1 the lowest payoﬀs against sG
i and sj for j  = i,i + 1 among all
action plans in Si+1. Deﬁne rB
i+1 ∈ ST




i+1 gives the highest payoﬀs against sB
i and sj for j  = i,i + 1 among all action plans in
ST
i+1. Redeﬁne ¯ v and v so that Ui+1(rG
i+1,sG
i ) = ¯ vi+1 and Ui+1(rB
i+1,sB
i ) = vi+1.
In other words, ¯ vi is the lowest payoﬀ player i can get if she uses an action plan in Si and
her monitor plays her favorable action plan, while vi represents the highest payoﬀ that player i
can get irrespective of what she plays when her monitor plays her unfavorable plan.
Partial Strategies: Specifying Play in Γi,G−i
Players play the following strategies in the pairwise games Γi,G−i.
• Players always report their names truthfully.
• Each player plays the following strategies separately against each possible playgroup that
she could be in.
47– Initial Period of Γi,G−i: Player i plays sG
i with probability  0 and sB
i with prob-
ability (1 −  0) where  0 solves vi+1 =  0¯ vi+1 + (1 −  0)vi+1. Note that since
(1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi < vi < ǫvi + (1 − ǫ)¯ vi ∀i, we will have  0,1 −  0 ≥ ǫ.
– Plan Period of a Non-Initial Block: If player i ever observed a deviation in the
signature period of an earlier block with any playgroup, she plays sB
i with probability
(1 − βl), where l is the number of deviations she has seen so far and β > 0 is small.
Otherwise, she plays sG
i with probability   and sB
i with probability (1− ) where the
mixing probability   is used to tailor (i + 1)’s continuation payoﬀ.
For any history ˆ hT
i observed (at calendar time c) by i in the last block, specify (i+1)’s
continuation payoﬀ as follows. Let c denote the current calendar time period, and
let c(t),t ∈ {1,...,T} denote the calendar time period of the tth period of the most
recently elapsed block.
If sB

















τ M(K−1)(T+1−τ) if c − c(τ) = T + 1 − τ
0 otherwise,
and θB
t is the diﬀerence between (i + 1)’s continuation payoﬀ within the last block
from playing rB
i+1 from time t on and (i + 1)’s continuation payoﬀ from playing the
action observed by i at period t as in history ht
i followed by reversion to rB
i+1 from
t + 1 on. Notice that θB
t ≥ 0. If sB
i was played in the last block, player i chooses






















τ }M(K−1)(T+1−τ) if c − c(τ) = T + 1 − τ
0 otherwise,
and θG
t is the diﬀerence between (i + 1)’s continuation payoﬀ within the last block
48from playing rG
i+1 from time t on and (i + 1)’s continuation payoﬀ from playing the
action observed by i at period t as in history ˆ ht
i followed by reversion to rG
i+1 from
t + 1 on. Note that θG
t ≤ 0 for all actions that are used by strategies in Si+1. If sG
i
was played in the last block, player i chooses   ∈ (0,1) to solve  ¯ vi+1 +(1− )vi+1 =
¯ vi+1 + (1 − δ)ωG
i+1(ˆ hT
−i).





i ) < ǫvi+1 + (1 − ǫ)¯ vi+1 − vi+1 and
(1 − δ)ωG
i+1(ˆ hT
i ) > (1 − ǫ)vi+1 + ǫ¯ vi+1 − ¯ vi+1.
Then, continuation payoﬀs lie within the interval [(1 − ǫ)vi+1 + ǫ¯ vi+1, ǫvi+1 + (1 −
ǫ)¯ vi+1].
– Signature Periods and other Non-initial Periods: In signature periods, players
use the designated signature ψi(a) if a was the proﬁle realized in the plan period. For
the rest of the block, they play as per the announced plan.
6.3.5 Beliefs of Players
After every history, players believe that in every period so far, they met the true owners of the
names they encountered.
6.3.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Here, we prove optimality on the equilibrium path. Since the proof for consistency of beliefs
and sequential rationality oﬀ the equilibrium path are identical to the two community case,
these proofs are omitted. First we show that conditional on truthful reporting of names, these
strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Fix a player i and a rival playgroup G−i. The partial strategy for player i in her game Γi,G−i
can be represented by an automaton that revises actions and states in every plan period. The
following describes the automaton for any player i.
Set of States: The set of states of a player i in a game with a particular playgroup is the set
of continuation payoﬀs for her successor i + 1 in that playgroup and is the interval [(1 − ǫ)vi +
ǫ¯ vi,ǫvi + (1 − ǫ)¯ vi].
Initial State: Player i’s initial state is the target payoﬀ for her successor vi+1.
49Decision Function: When i is in state u, she uses action plan sG
i with probability   and sB
i
with probability (1− ) where   solves u =  
 




(1 − ǫ)vi+1 + ǫ¯ vi+1
 
Transition Function: For any history ˆ hT
i in the last T-period block for player i, if the realized
action plan is sG
i then at the end of the block, the state transits to ¯ vi+1 + (1 − δ)ωG
i+1(ˆ hT
i ). If
the realized action is sB
i the new state is vi+1 + (1 − δ)ωB
i+1(ˆ hT
i ).
It can be easily seen that given i’s strategy, any strategy of player i + 1 whose restriction
belongs to Si+1 is a best response. The average payoﬀ within a block from playing rG
i+1 against
sG
i is exactly ¯ vi+1, and that from playing rB
i+1 against sB
i is vi. Moreover, the continuation
payoﬀs are also ¯ vi+1 and vi+1 respectively. Any player’s payoﬀ is therefore  0¯ vi + (1 −  0)vi.
Further, as in the case of two communities, each player is indiﬀerent between all possible
action plans when her monitor plays the unfavorable action plan. At any stage τ of a block, she




her next plan period with this playgroup is exactly
T +1−τ calendar time periods away, and in that case, for any action she chooses now she will
receive a proportionate reward θB
τ M(K−1)(T+1−τ). This makes her indiﬀerent across all action
plans in expectation.
It remains to verify that players will truthfully report their names in equilibrium. We show
below that if a player impersonates someone else in her community, irrespective of the action
she plays, there is a positive probability that her playgroup will become aware that a deviation
has occurred. Further, if a deviation is detected, her monitor will punish her whole community
(which includes her in particular). For suﬃciently patient players this threat is enough to deter
impersonation.
At any calendar time t, deﬁne the state of play between any player i and any rival playgroup
G−i to be k ∈ {1,...,T} where k is the period of the current block they are playing in. At time
(t + 1), they will either transit to state k + 1 with probability 1
MK−1 (if i happens to meet the
same playgroup again in the next calendar time period) or remain in state k.
Suppose at time t player i1 decides to impersonate i2. Conditional on her private history, i1
can form beliefs over the possible states that each of her possible playgroups is in with respect
to i2. Suppose i1 has met the sequence of playgroups {G 1
−i,...,G
t−1
−i }. She knows that the
playgroup she meets in any period remains in the same state with i2 in that period. Fix any
playgroup G−i whom i1 can be matched to. Player i1 has a belief over the possible states G−i
is in with respect to i2. Represent i1’s beliefs over the states by a vector (p1,...,pn).








































M−1 0 ... 0
. . .
1














1 if G−i = G τ
−i,
0 otherwise.
To derive the above expression, note that player i1 knows that in periods when she met playgroup
G−i it is not possible that i2 met the same playgroup. Hence in these periods, the state of play
between i2 and G−i did not change. In other periods the state changed according to the transition
matrix H. This leads to the last product term. Now for any calendar period τ, player i1 can
use this information to compute the state of play between i2 and G−i conditioning on the event
that they met for the ﬁrst time ever in period τ. For any τ, the probability that i2 and G−i









M−1. Finally player i1
knows that i2 and G−i could not have met for the ﬁrst time in a period when she herself met
playgroup G−i, and so does not need to condition on such periods.
Notice that the initial state (1,0,...,0) and H form an irreducible Markov chain with
lim








Further it can be easily shown that the following is true.
∀q ≥ 1, [(1,0,...,0)   Hq]2 > 0, (8)
where [(1,0,...,0)   Hq]2 represents the 2nd component of (1,0,...,0)   Hq.
It follows from (7) and (8) that for any playgroup G−i whom i1 has not met at least in one
period, there exists a lower bound φ > 0 such that the probability of G−i being in state 2 with
i2 is at least φ.
51Now, when i1 announces name i2, she does not know which playgroup she will end up meeting
that period. It follows that at t ≥ 2, player i1 assigns probability at least
φ
MK−1(M−1) to the
event that the rival she meets is in state 2 with i2. (To see why, pick a playgroup G ′
−i whom
i1 did not meet in the ﬁrst calendar time period (t = 1). With probability 1
MK−1, at time t, i1
will meet this G ′
−i and with probability 1
M−1 this G ′
−i would have met i2 at t = 1 and period t
could be their signature period.)
Consequently, if player i1 impersonates i2, there is a strictly positive probability ǫK φ
MK−1(M−1)
that the impersonation will get detected. This is because if the playgroup she meets is supposed
to be in a signature period with i2, they should play one of the actions proﬁles g,b,x,y depend-
ing on the realized plan in their plan period. Since players mix with probability at least ǫ on
both Plans G and B, with probability at least ǫK, i1 will play the wrong action irrespective of
what action she chooses. Her playgroup will be informed of a deviation, and her monitor will
switch to the bad plan B with all playgroups in the next respective plan period.
i1 will not impersonate any other player if her maximal potential gain from deviating is not
greater than the minimal expected loss in continuation payoﬀ from detection.13




δ + MK−1(1 − δ)
 
γ.






δ + MK−1(1 − δ)
 T
[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
To derive the expected loss in continuation payoﬀ, note that there is a minimal probability
φ
MK−1(M−1) that i2 and playgroup G−i are in a signature period. Conditional on this event,
irrespective of the action played, there is a minimal probability ǫK that player i1’s deviation is
detected by playgroup G−i. Conditional on detection, the relevant monitor will switch to the
unfavorable strategy with probability (1−β) in the next plan period with i1. At best, this plan
period is T − 1 periods away, after which player i1’s payoﬀ will drop from v1 to (1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi.













δ + MK−1(1 − δ)
 T
[vi − ((1 − ǫ)vi + ǫ¯ vi)].
For δ close enough to 1, this inequality is satisﬁed, and so misreporting ones name is not a prof-
itable deviation. Now consider incentives for truth-telling in the ﬁrst period of the supergame.
13As before, because of the random matching process, the eﬀective discount factor for any player in her pairwise
game is not δ, but
δ
δ+MK−1(1−δ).
52Suppose i1 impersonates i2 at t = 1 and meets playgroup G−i. In the next period, with probabil-
ity ǫ
K
MK−1, i2 will meet the same playgroup G−i and use the wrong signature, thus informing G−i
that someone has deviated. By a similar argument as above, if δ is high enough, i1’s potential
current gain will be outweighed by the future loss in continuation payoﬀ caused by her monitor’s
punishment. ￿
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